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Abstract 
 Throughout the years there has been literature regarding the impacts of Chinese 
manufacturing on the United States economy. Much of the focus has been centered on 
macro-economic effects and not firm level impacts. Using trade exposure and data from 
publically traded manufacturing firms I provide an analysis of the potential effects of 
increased trade exposure in a highly competitive market. My research aims to measure 
the impacts of Chinese imports on United States manufacturing companies with low 
technological barriers to entry. When comparing trade exposure to firm level data I 
conclude that there is a negative correlation between investment levels and import 
exposure, but no correlation between imports and firm valuations. My research under no 
circumstances can imply causation, but it finds areas of correlation that can be used as a 
foundation for further research.  
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I Introduction 
 What impact does China have on the financial metrics of United States 
manufacturing firms? Ever since the start of the “Trade War”, China-United States trade 
relations have been put under a microscope. Many of the questions about the trade 
imbalance today are centered on the loss of manufacturing jobs in Middle America.1 
During the 1990’s, China lowered their trade barriers and restrictions on foreign direct 
investment; as a result China experienced dramatic growth in their manufacturing 
exports, increasing from 2.3% of the world’s total in 1991 to 18.3% in 2014. (Autor, 
Dorn, Hanson, 2016)  
  There has been considerable research on how increased Chinese competition has 
impacted employment, innovation, and income in the United States. There has been less 
research, however, on how increased Chinese competition has impacted financial asset 
valuations for manufacturing firms. In my research I analyze data to determine if an 
increase in imports in United States adversely affects valuation metrics for low 
technology firms.2  
The tension between China and the United States is near an all-time high. 
(Gallup) The deterioration in relations is being driven by the trade war with China, 
placing the world’s two largest economies head to head. The United States exposure to 
                                                          
1 Acemglu, Autor, Dorn, Hanson, Price (2016) concluded that the United States lost 2.0-2.4 million jobs are 
a consequence of rising Chinese import competition. 
2 During the period of 2002-2011 China’s ability to compete with the United State in regards to advance 
technology manufacturing was limited: “China has benefited from the catch-up advantage, by means of 
importing advanced technology from industry countries, rather than having to pioneer new technologies” 
(Zhang. 2016) For this reason I have excluded high tech manufacturing because competition from China is 
limited. China today is in fact a net tech importer, further showing their limitations in this space. (Lewis, 
2019) 
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Chinese imports increases every year. U.S. goods trade deficit with China stood at $103.1 
billion in 2002 and increased by more than 300% to $315.5 billion in 2012. The 
percentage increase in the trade deficit has slowed with an increase of 33% from 2012 to 
2018, and a monetary increase of $104.425 billion. (census.gov) Even though deficits 
have slowed, the increased exposure to Chinese imports is saturating markets in the 
United States and hurting U.S. companies as they are unable to compete with the cheap 
labor costs in China. China has also gained an advantage on United States companies 
through their policies and practices related to technology transfer and intellectual 
property. Many have characterized these policies as unreasonable, discriminatory and 
restrictive to U.S. commerce. (ustr.gov) Both China’s cheap labor and political tactics 
have increased competition in the United States and should theoretically lead to domestic 
companies experiencing lower valuations due to a smaller moat. Other things remaining 
constant, as competition increases, margins should decrease and thus reducing the value 
of firms. The incentives to reinvest in research and development might also be weakened 
as innovations may be unlikely to increase US manufacturing efficiency enough to 
compensate for China’s lower wages. 
In this paper I estimate how increased competition from China affects valuation 
metrics of United States manufacturing firms that have exposure to Chinese imports. I 
specifically analyze firms that have low technological barriers to entry in their respective 
industry. I measured trade exposure by measuring the change in import penetration 
resulting from an increase in trade exposure with China. I hypothesize that increased 
exposure to Chinese manufacturing imports will cause valuation metrics to fall, 
specifically Simple Tobin’s q (market capitalization of equity to book value of assets). I 
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additionally expect to find decreases in margins, profits, and levels of investment. 
Decreasing profitability and decreasing innovation as a result of increased competition3 
leads to manufacturing in the United States having little competitive advantage over their 
Chinese counterparts. The reduction of profitability and a shrinking technology gap could 
cause U.S. companies to invest less in themselves, thus lowering their asset value. My 
hypothesis does not exclusively apply to Simple q but also to TEV to EBITDA, market 
cap and capital expenditures to depreciation and amortization.  
 My empirical strategy isolates U.S. import growth and analyzes the impact on 
different financial metrics, specifically financials that can reflect the level of the 
company’s investment. For this reason, I analyze the impact of trade exposure on 
property plant and equipment, debt, cash, capital expenditures, research and development 
expenses, EBIT, EBITDA, and revenue. I am trying to see the impact on these variables 
to better understand how and why certain valuation measures and investment levels are 
changing due to exposure to Chinese imports. My results show that increased import 
exposure does not correlate with levels of valuation but does negatively correlate with 
levels of investment.  
 The contribution of my thesis is to provide information on how industry exposure 
to Chinese manufacturing imports may affect Tobin’s q, TEV/EBITDA, and levels of 
firm investment. My study is building off the findings from Autor, Dorn, Hanson, Pisano, 
and Shu (2017) who study increased competition from China. They show that increased 
trade penetration is stifling innovation through lowering patent production of United 
                                                          
3Although competition often leads to innovation, Autor, Dorn, Hanson, Pisano, and Shu (2017) concluded 
that increased competition from Chinese imports has led to a decrease in patenting.   
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States manufacturing firms. My work attempts to provide further insights into how trade 
shocks can impact the financial strength of exposed manufacturing firms through 
analyzing the change in Tobin’s q and TEV/EBITDA over time.   
II  Literature Review  
         There is a substantial research on how Chinese manufacturing impacts the United 
States. One strand of literature examines the effects that increased Chinese trade has had 
on U.S. innovation, as measured through patenting rates for United States manufacturing 
firms. The existing literature on China’s influence on the United States is reviewed in this 
section. 
2.1  Import Exposure from China 
         The United States felt its exposure to Chinese imports during the early 2000’s, 
when many of the jobs the U.S. gained in manufacturing during the 1990’s were 
eliminated. (Acemglu, Autor, Dorn, Hanson, Price, 2015). Since then, China has 
considerably impacted the United States job market, in part, through increased import 
competition. Acemglu, Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Price estimated that job losses 
stemming from Chinese import competition is between 2.0-2.4 million jobs over the 
period of 1999-2011. Although the direct impact of labor is substantial, the indirect 
impacts of Chinese imports on investments could have potential long-term effects that 
should be analyzed and not ignored.  
In addition to addressing the impact of manufacturing on patenting, Autor, Dorn, 
Hanson, Pisano, and Shu (2017) also examined the impact on a number of different 
variables. They concluded that the impact of imports has been statistically significant for 
global sales, R&D spending, advertising spending, global employment, global capital, 
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stock market value, book value, and the likelihood that profits increase. This shows the 
breadth of impact that Chinese manufacturing has on the United States and has sparked a 
debate of whether the domestic benefits of trade with China have outweighed the cost. 
There are clearly a wide range of consequences of Chinese trade on United States 
companies other than just the contraction of employment (Autor, Dorn, Hanson, Price 
2015) as sales, profitability, and investment have also contracted. These contractions may 
result in serious economic consequences down the line and even a further downturn in 
U.S. manufacturing. The rewards for innovation in United States manufacturing are now 
substantially less than they have been historically as exporters like China require 
technology transfers for foreign direct investment and then compete on production with 
lower wages.  
         Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2016) try and address the question of where trade is 
costly to the U.S. and where trade can be beneficial. This can help explain the importance 
of trade in the United States today, where there is room for growth, and which industries 
may become less competitive and profitable in the future. There is no doubt that trade has 
shaped China’s economy tremendously and helped lift hundreds of millions of Chinese 
men and women out of poverty but that development has also changed the labor market 
in the United States substantially. Even though there appears to be no net decrease on 
employment as a whole, employment has fallen drastically in industries exposed to 
import competition from China. (Autor, Dorn, Hanson 2016) A worker’s wage is a strong 
indicator of their position’s vulnerability when exposed to trade competition. As a result, 
lower-wage employees experience a larger reduction in both annual and lifetime earnings 
when exposed to increases in trade. (Autor, Dorn, Hanson 2016) The impact that trade 
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has on the United States’ economy and labor force make it an important topic to 
continually research. If there is an impact on the value of the companies that provide 
those jobs, could this also lead to adverse effect on employment for United States 
manufacturing firms as they reduce labor in order to increase profit? This is a potential 
area of investigation as the labor force becomes more exposed to technological 
advancement over time. 
2.2  China, FDI, and IPR  
One of the largest drivers in China’s rise to becoming a manufacturing power was 
the country’s ability to attract foreign direct investment (FDI).4 China remains the largest 
recipient of FDI among developing countries. FDI is a major driver of trade, investment, 
and tax revenue generation. (China Investment Policy: An Update, Davies, 2013). While 
granting foreign investors access to China’s market has previously provided many 
benefits to the investor’s state of origin, those benefits may not be available for much 
longer. China is currently experiencing rising labor costs and shortages of skilled labor. 
In addition to those workforce challenges, there are fears of protectionist investment 
policies emerging as practices develop that appear to be discriminatory to foreign owned 
companies. (Davies, 2013). This becomes particularly troubling as American companies 
would not be able to offset the damage of increased imports by relocating factories to 
China. Although they still have the ability to relocate to countries other than China, being 
prohibited from the world’s most robust labor force could have potential negative 
impacts. China’s policies on foreign investors and foreign companies may create a further 
divide in trade relations as incentives decrease for foreign entities to innovate if their 
                                                          
4 See appendix figure7 
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potential gains could be threatened by discriminatory policies in China. As a result 
China’s policies on foreign direct investment and treatment of foreigners may make it 
difficult for China to expand their manufacturing toward capital intensive industries, 
potentially creating safety for high tech manufacturing in the United States.  
         The discriminatory policies are not the only FDI issue investors in China may 
face going forward. One of the other major concerns for foreign investors is intellectual 
property rights (IPR) protection (Davies 2013). If property rights are not protected in 
Chinese markets then innovation may become less likely. This may stifle growth in high 
tech sectors as many countries and companies refuse to bring their latest technology to 
markets in China where it could be most utilized. (Davies 2013) If companies are at 
threat of losing exclusive rights to their ideas then the willingness to innovate may lessen. 
Although this issue is not presented as a reason for a decline in U.S. patenting, it is 
something that should be considered when discussing deterrents for innovation.  
         Aside from their investment policies, the Chinese manufacturing industry has 
adopted practices that create an unfair and uncompetitive manufacturing environment. 
China’s dumping measures have made it nearly impossible for foreign companies to 
compete with the artificially low prices of Chinese manufacturing firms. Some 
manufacturing firms in China have been flooding the world economy with products at 
uncompetitive prices made possible by government subsidies. (The Dark Side of China’s 
Economic Rise, Wuttke, 2017). A lack of competition has stifled research and innovation 
as certain industries are become less and less profitable: “As companies in industries 
characterized by overcapacity face low profit margins, they lack sufficient funds for 
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R&D projects, which leads to less innovation.” (Wuttke 2017). The industries that have 
been damaged significantly by overcapacity are steel, aluminum, paper, and chemicals. In 
my research I hope to examine whether or not low technology manufacturing industries 
have experienced lower valuations in Tobin’s q. 
         When researching scholarly articles on China, it is clear that there are factors 
other than cheap labor and increased manufacturing capacity that have potentially stifled 
innovation. The aforementioned issues regarding FDI and IPR have also damaged 
incentives for further technological development. When examining China and United 
States economic relations, the actions that China takes or does not take in regard to 
protecting other nations should be considered when evaluating the potential effects in 
regard to manufacturing companies. My research will not explicitly touch on these issues 
but it is important to keep in mind alternative factors that may affect investment of 
United States firms exposed to Chinese exports.  
2.3  Tobin’s q 
         Tobin’s q was originally created for macro-economics and originally defined as 
the market value of a firm's assets divided by their replacement value. (Bartlett, Partnoy 
2018). This metric was used as a tool to determine if more or less investment was needed. 
In this paper I am using what is known as Simple q, which instead of a measure for firm 
investment, is a measure of market-to-book ratio. Simple q is “bias upward by research 
and development, brand management, and human capital.” (Bartlett, Partnoy, 2017). 
Chinese import exposure has been found to lower research and development expenses, 
(Autor, Dorn, Hanson, Pisano and Shu, 2017) for this reason I hypothesize that I should 
find a decrease in Simple q in my data. Lindenberg and Ross (1981) discovered that 
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Tobin’s q is high when the firm has valuable intangible assets in additional to physical 
capital, such as monopoly power, goodwill, a stock of patents, or good managers. I 
expect that manufacturing firms should see a decrease in physical capital and stock of 
patents, and therefore I should expect to see a decrease in Simple q in my research. 
Working with Simple q in my research will help answer how exposure to Chinese 
manufacturing has impacted assets.  
 Bartlett and Partnoy (2017) point out that Simple q has limitations and is not 
always the best valuation measure. Firms with high market-to-book ratios are likely to 
generate relatively low future returns to shareholders. Additionally, they found that 
Simple q is inversely affected by financial performance: “Simple q is inversely associated 
with the following year’s annual returns on both a gross and risk adjusted basis.” (Bartlett 
and Partnoy, 2017). On this basis, Simple q increases should be an indicator of poor 
future financial performance. Although that is a broad generalization, it highlights the 
issues of using just Simple q as a valuation metric for my data. Due to potential 
complications with Simple q outlined in Bartlett and Partnoy, I have also decided to look 
at enterprise value to EBITDA as another valuation metric.  
2.4  Literature Expansion 
         Although the impact of Chinese exports on the United States is well documented, 
the research on the impact of valuation and financial metrics is limited. My aim is to 
expand the understanding of how Chinese exports have influenced company valuations. I 
am going to analyze both the numerator and denominator of Simple q and analyze the 
potential reasons for why the valuation has changed. I will also examine the market value 
and book value separately to see if either one of those have been significantly impacted 
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by exposures to Chinese exports. My research investigates only low capital-intensive 
industries and does not include sectors with high barriers to entry. For companies where 
much of the value is tied to the patent and thus the good cannot be easily replicated, i.e. 
semiconductors and pharmaceuticals, I removed them from the sample since import 
penetration should not increase competition for their product.  
III Data 
 I started my data construction matching the trade data categories to corresponding 
SIC codes in order to properly account for increased import penetration. In my second 
step, I composed a list of metrics for companies with manufacturing SIC codes and 
matched the corresponding trade penetration with the companies trading metrics. The 
data shows the effect of increased import penetration on different valuation and financial 
metrics.   
3.1 International Trade Data 
 From 1984 to 1990, China’s share of world exports increased from 1.2% to 1.9%, 
from 1991 to 1999, their world share of exports doubled to 4.0% of the world 
manufacturing exports. (Autor, Dorn, Hanson, Pisano and Shu, 2017). This number 
increased to 18.8% by 2013. The reasons for massive increases in Chinese exports during 
the 1900’s and 2000’s stems from the rapid increase in foreign direct investment5 and 
entrance into the World Trade Organization in 2001. I have measured trade exposure by 
measuring the change in trade in the manufacturing sector and matching that to a 
                                                          
5 Appendix Figure 7 
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company that is in the same sector. This has allowed me to match each company with the 
trade increase of that year.  
I extracted my data for international trade from the World Bank World Integrated 
Trade Solution Database spanning from 2002 to 2011. This gives a breakdown of imports 
by sector, which I then matched to the corresponding firms SIC number using the SEC 
code list. I chose this year range for three reasons, to match the similar time frames from 
other academic studies on Chinese imports, to correspond with China’s fast increase in 
global share of exports and to eliminate distortions in the valuations from the tech bubble. 
3.2 Simple Tobin’s q, Firm-Level Data and Other Financial Metrics 
I used the Compustat database and compiled public information from all 
manufacturing stocks between 2002 and 2011 with corresponding low technology SIC 
codes.6 When doing this I pulled a number of different variables to measure the financial 
impact trade exposure has had on a number of different financial metrics over the 9-year 
period I am evaluating. The metrics I am evaluating include changes in: market value to 
assets, enterprise value to EBITDA, market cap, capital expenditure to depreciation and 
amortization, revenue, EBIT, EBIT margin, EBITDA, EBITDA margin, research and 
development expense, research and development expense margin, capital expenditure, 
capital expenditure to EBITDA, total assets, property plant and equipment, debt, and cash 
and short term investments. I also use a vector of variables to control for the 
manufacturing industry, company size, and impacts from the Great Recession. 
                                                          
6 See Appendix for SIC codes used 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Regression Variables 
 
 The issue with pulling the data from Compustat is that it often lacked full 
information for a number of variables, including total assets, which made the selection 
biased toward larger companies as the missing information was mostly for the smaller 
companies. The data set also did not account for mergers and acquisitions, changes from 
public to private, or bankruptcies. This made it difficult to determine what was 
influencing particular jumps in valuation metrics.  
Count Mean Variance StDev Minimum Maximum Sum
Valuation Metrics
Δ Trade 3308 13314.540 166000000.00 12874.70 -11075.16 39439.67 44000000.00
Δ Tobins Q 3308 -0.034 136817.70 369.89 -15032.76 15045.59 -111.28
Δ Market Value 3308 285.467 32200000.00 5678.89 -128254.00 94522.66 944323.00
Δ TEV to EBITDA 3291 2.238 37892.47 194.66 -4522.14 4540.95 7365.35
Δ Capex to D&A. 3282 -0.003 11.65 3.41 -118.53 111.42 -11.28
Sales, Profit, and Expenditures
Δ Revenue 3308 281.956 24500000.00 4954.56 -149507.00 91948.00 932710.30
Δ EBIT 3308 44.650 1243570.00 1115.16 -40051.00 15405.00 147702.40
Δ EBIT Margin 3308 0.230 1974.50 44.44 -1171.66 1132.30 759.40
Δ EBITDA 3308 51.357 1315580.00 1146.99 -40513.00 16726.00 169888.10
Δ EBITDA Margin 3308 0.220 1902.74 43.62 -1138.27 1142.02 728.88
Δ R&D Expense 3308 1.154 2493.83 49.94 -1495.00 647.00 3817.41
Δ R&D Expense Percent 3308 -0.036 198.18 14.08 -515.18 475.61 -117.94
Δ Capital Expenditure 3308 15.841 59237.14 243.39 -1972.00 6888.00 52401.18
Δ Capex to EBITDA 3291 0.213 138.02 11.75 -245.93 503.41 702.12
Balance Sheet Items
Δ Debt 3308 15.049 132319.70 363.76 -5915.00 5098.00 49782.19
Δ Cash 3308 32.146 413353.10 642.93 -21145.00 12509.00 106338.70
Δ PPE 3308 74.443 1741143.00 1319.52 -8417.00 60432.00 246257.80
Δ Asset 3308 206.439 5676192.00 2382.48 -47059.00 69187.00 682901.20
Company Size
Small Cap 3308 0.841 0.13 0.37 0.00 1.00 2783.00
Mid Cap 3308 0.134 0.12 0.34 0.00 1.00 443.00
Large Cap 3308 0.025 0.02 0.16 0.00 1.00 82.00
Industry
Chemicals 3308 0.059 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 196.00
Metals 3308 0.100 0.09 0.30 0.00 1.00 331.00
Machinery and Electronics 3308 0.761 0.18 0.43 0.00 1.00 2516.00
Plastic and Rubber 3308 0.080 0.07 0.27 0.00 1.00 265.00
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Additionally, it was difficult to distinguish which companies developed high-tech 
products. Import penetration of high-tech products should be minimal, as China’s ability 
to produce certain high-tech products during this time is limited. (Lewis, 2019) The one 
industry that I was able to account for is the healthcare industry but Compustat was not 
able to distinguish which healthcare companies have products with high technological 
barriers to entry and which ones do not. As a result, I eliminated healthcare firms entirely 
from my sample to create a dataset that more accurately represents manufacturing 
companies that are exposed to Chinese imports.  
Lastly, the most important deficiency with Compustat for my purposes, is that it 
only accounts for publicly traded companies. Privately held firms still account for a 
majority of companies in America (McKinsey & Company), as a result I am missing a 
substantial amount of data. The largest issue I ran into with the data I was able to obtain 
was that the World Bank trade database did not break down their trade imports into 
Harmonized System (HS) codes which are much more specific and would have allowed 
me to better match import penetration to each firm. This made my measurements less 
accurate because I could not more specifically target import penetration by the specific 
sector, instead I had to use data that was not as precise as it could have been. HS codes do 
not come without flaws as they classify products based solely on their physical 
characteristics while SIC codes care classifications of business activities that incorporate 
both product characteristics and type of economic activity. (Pierce and Schott. 2012)  
There were also issues that could not be controlled. Unknown variables, such as the state 
of the market, made it hard to fully distinguish what impact Chinese imports is having 
and what impact is caused by the bears and bulls of the stock market. I attempted to 
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address these stock market distortions by eliminating years prior to 2002 to account for 
the tech bubble. Finally, the data cannot account for economic drivers. In my data I 
attempt to control for these variables but in some cases that may not be enough to fully 
eliminate their impact. 
3.3 Trends in Import Penetration and Financial Data 
 When evaluating Figure 1, it is clear that the increase in trade from China from 
imported goods has increased drastically over the 9 period. There was the same dollar 
value increase from 1991 to 1999, as there was from 2000 to 2003. The dollar value 
tripled during the span of 2001 to 2006. As a result, the impact penetration in the early 
2000’s is expected to Simple q and other financial metrics relative to later years. 
 
Figure 1: Total Trade Imports from China (Numbers in Thousands) 
 
As you can see from Figure 2, even as import penetration increases the market to 
book ratio increases from .96 to 1.54. This represents an increase of 60%. This could 
relate to the findings in Bartlett and Partnoy (2017) in regards to increases in Simple q 
0
50,000,000
100,000,000
150,000,000
200,000,000
250,000,000
300,000,000
350,000,000
400,000,000
450,000,000
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
20 
 
valuation as inversely associated with the following year’s annual returns. This means 
that profitability of companies decrease in later years, the value of Simple q should 
increase over the same time frame. The growth in Simple q from my data is driven by a 
more rapid acceleration in market value in comparison to value of assets as shown in 
figure 3.  
 
Figure 2: Simple q 
 
Figure 3: Total Asset Value and Total Market Value of Firms in Sample 
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I` also examine at the trends in enterprise value to EBITDA in my sample. Figure 4 
shows a decline in the valuation metric. There are a number of factors that could have 
influenced this, such as projected revenue growth and changes in capital structure, and it 
is consistent with what I expected to find in my hypothesis.  
Figure 4: Enterprise Value to EBITDA 
 
Figure 5 shows a decrease in research and development expenses which would 
coincide with the findings found in Autor, Dorn, Hanson, Pisano, and Shu (2017), but an 
increase in the EBITDA margin. This is something I did not expect to find because I 
expected that increased competition would be associated with lower levels of 
profitability. There is also a chance that import exposure did little to impact domestic 
profits, as there are many variables that affect firm performance.  
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Figure 5: R&D Expense Percent and EBITDA Margin 
 
I also investigate levels of investment, as depreciation outpacing capital 
expenditures can be a sign of an unhealthy firm. Figure 6 shows capex to depreciation 
and amortization increases, a trend that indicates companies are continue to spend on 
invested capital even as import exposure increases. 
Figure 6: Capital Expenditure to Depreciation and Amortization 
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IV Empirical Strategies and Main Results 
I estimated the impact of changes in industry exposure to imports from China on 
the changes of Simple q at the firm level. The baseline regression used for my data is as 
followed. 
Δ𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽Δ𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
Δ𝑄𝑄 is the change in Simple q for each individual firm 𝑖𝑖 in industry r during the annual 
change from the previous year for year t. Δ𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the change in imports. 𝑋𝑋 is a vector of 
variables used to control for specific factors that may cause Simple q to change, which 
includes the recession and three different company sizes. 𝑋𝑋 changes depending on which 
subset of data I am running. I used this formula to evaluate a number of additional 
metrics, replacing Δ𝑄𝑄 with different valuation and financial metrics.  
 My empirical strategy comes with some concerns. My ability to accurately 
measure Δ𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 as it corresponds to a specific SIC code is limited. The causes of changes in 
imports are also difficult to determine. U.S. demand shocks could influence trade 
penetration, which it did 2008 during the Great Recession, but also trade wars and 
product substitutes from other countries can have an impact. Similar issues arise with 
changes in Tobin’s q and TEV to EBITDA. The decrease in the metrics can be related to 
other industry factors unrelated to import exposure, such as U.S. demand for domestic 
products or GDP growth. My empirical model has its flaws but my research is aimed at 
capturing correlation and not causation, which my model is capable of doing.  
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4.1 Restate Hypothesis 
 Prior to my research, I believed that the manufacturing sectors increased exposure 
to Chinese imports would lower firm valuations and show decreases in margins and 
investment. As patenting output is lower for U.S. manufacturing firms, I hypothesized 
that this would also lower investment levels in the manufacturing industries I am 
evaluating. If there were lower levels of investment and increased competition, I expected 
to see lower valuation metrics. The valuation metric I emphasize is Simple q. The metric 
may change depending on the study but almost always acts as some variation of market 
value of assets to market value of equity. My hypothesis is centered on the theory that 
increased competition from Chinese manufacturing firms will lower valuations of U.S. 
firms in exposed markets. My research also looks at margins, expenditures, and valuation 
metrics in firms with low technological barriers to entry.  
4.2 Regression Results  
 My regression results are split into four different categories and control for four 
different variables. The categories I regressed were split in to valuation metrics (Table 1), 
sales and profit margins (Table 2), expenditures (Table 3), and balance sheet items (Table 
4). My regressions controlled for four different variables: recession and different 
company sizes. Company size was split into small cap, mid cap, and large cap firms.7 I 
controlled for the onset of the Great Recession because public companies took a financial 
hit for reasons unrelated to trade exposure and the data should better capture the 
correlation of Chinese imports on United States manufacturing firms with the absence of 
                                                          
7 Small cap firms were determined by having a market cap smaller than $2 billion. Mid cap was determined 
through having a market cap between $2 and $20 billion. Large cap was determined by having a market cap 
larger than $20 billion.  
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data from the changes in 2008 to 2009. I controlled for company size to better control for 
multinational firms. A large company should, in theory, be more capable of moving their 
manufacturing abroad as they have the capital to do so, while smaller companies may be 
limited in their ability to move manufacturing locations. Additionally large companies 
have advantages such as brand recognition that may help further limit the impact of 
Chinese imports.  
Table 2: Regression on Valuation Metrics 
  
 
A. Valuation    
From 2002-2011
Δ Tobins Q 
(Market to Book)
Δ Market Value
Δ TEV to 
EBITDA
Δ Capex to 
D&A.
Δ U.S. Industry Exposure to 
Chinese Imports
0.0004559 
(.0004996)
.0025843 
(.0076713)
.0001721 
(.0002637)
.00000634 
(.00000463)
Mean Outcome Variable -0.0336399 285.4655 2.238026 -.00334366
Observations 3,308 3,308 3,291 3,282
No Recession Year
  
Δ U.S. Industry Exposure to 
Chinese Imports 
.0007156 
(.0006545)
.0031255 
(.0095165)
.0001104 
(.0003416)
.00000623 
(.0000048)
Mean Outcome Variable -0.0801074 295.8479 2.994422 0.0148027
Observations 2,981 2,981 2,966 2,957
Small Cap
 
Δ U.S. Industry Exposure to 
Chinese Imports 
.0005507 
(.0005987)
0.0020565 *** 
(.0006508)
.0001826 
(.0003151)
.0000066 
(.0000055)
Mean Outcome Variable -0.05064 -9.914943 2.801086 -0.014864
Observations 2,783 2,783 2,770 2,761
Mid Cap
 
Δ U.S. Industry Exposure to 
Chinese Imports 
.00000178 
(.000002)
.0190252 
(.0115708)
.0001209 
(.000141)
.00000497 *** 
(.00000163)
Mean Outcome Variable 0.0613309 349.2336 -0.829461 0.0623648
Observations 443 443 739 439
Large Cap
 
Δ U.S. Industry Exposure to 
Chinese Imports 
.000000136 
(.00000574)
.114755 
(.3037195)
-.0000575 
(.0000623)
.00001 
(.00000445)
Mean Outcome Variable 0.0302552 9965.925 -0.3601168 0.0290528
Observations 82 82 82 82
* p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01
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Table 3: Regression on Financial Metrics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B. Sales and Profit
From 2002-2011
Δ Revenue Δ EBIT Δ EBIT Margin Δ EBITDA
Δ EBITDA 
Margin
Δ U.S. Industry Exposure to 
Chinese Imports
-.0021299 
(.0066928)
.0009238 
(.0015063)
.0000326    
(.00006)
.0005076 
(.0015494)
.000032 
(.0000589)
Mean Outcome Variable 281.9559 44.65006 0.2265659 51.35675 0.2203397
Observations 3,308 3,308 3,308 3,308 3,308
No Recession Year
Δ U.S. Industry Exposure to 
Chinese Imports 
-.0355838 *** 
(.0064944)
-.0044272 *** 
(.0013523)
0.0000405 
(.0000778)
-.0050672 *** 
(.0014539)
.0000409 
(.0000764)
Mean Outcome Variable 466.3791 78.46952 0.2436907 84.93215 0.228418
Observations 2,981 2,981 2,981 2,981 2,981
Small Cap
Δ U.S. Industry Exposure to 
Chinese Imports 
.0006747 
(.0006176)
.0003407 *** 
(.0000864)
.0000387 
(.0000719)
.0003197 *** 
(.0000852)
.000038 
(.0000706)
Mean Outcome Variable 20.69503 1.169794 0.2709886 1.623958 0.2602806
Observations 2,783 2,783 2,783 2,783 2,783
Mid Cap
Δ U.S. Industry Exposure to 
Chinese Imports 
.00684  
(.0150129)
.0060759 *** 
(.0017972)
.00000147 *** 
(.000000233)
.0058561 *** 
(.0018336)
.0000012 *** 
.00000023
Mean Outcome Variable 606.6782 60.53385 0.0097264 69.71086 0.0084566
Observations 443 443 443 443 443
Large Cap
Δ U.S. Industry Exposure to 
Chinese Imports 
-.0007553 
(.259796)
.0179165 
(.0614104)
.0000004 
(.0000003)
.0061439 
(.0628985)
.0000001 
(.0000002770
Mean Outcome Variable 7394.604 1434.516 0.0113903 1640.082 0.0094688
Observations 82 82 82 82 82
* p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01
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Table 4: Regression on Expenditures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C. Expenditures
From 2002-2011
Δ R&D Expense
Δ R&D Expense 
Percent
Δ Capital 
Expenditure
Δ Capex to 
EBITDA
Δ U.S. Industry Exposure to 
Chinese Imports
.0001583 ** 
(.0000674)
-.0000123 
(.000019)
-.0004684 
(.003287)
.000011 
(.0000159)
Mean Outcome Variable 1.153993 -.0356543 15.84074 0.2155468
Observations 3,308 3,308 3,308 3,291
No Recession Year
Δ U.S. Industry Exposure to 
Chinese Imports 
.0000432 
(.0000814)
.00000786 
(.0000243)
-.0015051 *** 
(.0004128)
.00000924 
(.0000208)
Mean Outcome Variable 2.076491 -.079415 19.39228 0.246571
Observations 2,981 2,981 2,981 2,966
Small Cap
Δ U.S. Industry Exposure to 
Chinese Imports 
.0000408 
(.0000128)
-.0000148 
(.0000228)
.0000584 
(.0000369)
.0000132 
(.0000191)
Mean Outcome Variable 0.255613 -0.0420722 0.3299572 0.2596116
Observations 2,783 2,783 2,783 2,770
Mid Cap
Δ U.S. Industry Exposure to 
Chinese Imports 
.0005618 
(.00003385)
-.00000034 *** 
(.00000005)
.0006329 
(.0003651)
-.0000021 
(.0000021)
Mean Outcome Variable -3.857713 -0.001574 14.43049 -0.0190211
Observations 443 443 443 443
Large Cap
Δ U.S. Industry Exposure to 
Chinese Imports 
.0027278 
(.0018796)
-.0000002 ** 
(.00000001)
-.0157696 
(.0126587)
.0000007 
(.0000009)
Mean Outcome Variable 58.71956 -0.0019547 549.8805 -.014279
Observations 82 82 82 82
* p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01
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Table 5: Regression on Balance Sheet Items 
 
My results containing my entire data set showed two areas of statistical 
significance. Changes in research and development expenses and changes in property 
plant and equipment, both significant at the five percent level. I ran a separate regression 
removing changes from 2008 to 2009 in order to account for the Great Recession. This 
eliminated the issue of a single year experiencing both great declines in valuation and 
trade due to an extraneous variable. This regression contained a number of statistically 
D. Balance Sheet Items
From 2002-2011 Δ Debt Δ Cash Δ PPE Δ Asset
Δ U.S. Industry Exposure to 
Chinese Imports
-.0008817 
(.0004911)
-.0008         
(.0008684)
-.0048992 ** 
(.0017805)
-.0028873 
(.003218)
Mean Outcome Variable 15.04903 32.14592 74.44312 206.4393
Observations 3,308 3,308 3,308 3,308
No Recession Year
Δ U.S. Industry Exposure to 
Chinese Imports 
-.0009264 
(.0005952)
-.0022341 ** 
(.0009011)
-.0081663 *** 
(.0022608)
-.0092297 * 
(.0041779)
Mean Outcome Variable 11.84282 19.45973 74.93995 226.247
Observations 2,981 2,981 2,981 2,981
Small Cap
Δ U.S. Industry Exposure to 
Chinese Imports 
-.0000529 
(.0001619)
-.0000211 
(.0001114)
-.0001623 
(.0000981
.0005649 
(.000521)
Mean Outcome Variable 0.7250733 0.5134768 2.945474 2.93675
Observations 2,783 2,783 2,783 2,783
Mid Cap
Δ U.S. Industry Exposure to 
Chinese Imports 
-.0045682 ** 
(.0020065)
-.0034163 
(.0019244)
-.0029626 ** 
(.0011791)
.0019978 
(.0051269)
Mean Outcome Variable 88.4038 90.8319 61.95663 400.7707
Observations 443 443 443 443
Large Cap
Δ U.S. Industry Exposure to 
Chinese Imports 
-.0017709 
(.0159208)
.0059289 
(.0339602)
-.1382563 * 
(.0697812)
-.0307194 
(.1198465)
Mean Outcome Variable 104.8955 788.6726 2568.461 6063.254
Observations 82 82 82 82
* p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01
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significant results. Changes in revenue, EBIT, EBITDA, capital expenditure, and 
property plant and equipment are all significant at the one percent level. Changes in cash 
is significant at the five percent level and changes in assets is significant at the ten 
percent level. My small cap sample is significant at the one percent level for changes in 
market value, EBIT, and EBITDA. Mid cap is significant at the one percent level for 
changes in capital expenditure to depreciation and amortization, EBIT, EBIT margin, 
EBITDA, EBITDA margin, research and development expense percent. Mid cap is also 
significant at the five percent level for changes in debt and property plant and equipment. 
The large cap sample is significant at the five percent level for changes in research and 
development expense percent and significant at the ten percent level for changes in 
property plant and equipment.  
4.3 Analysis  
 My main regression that includes all data from the years of 2002 to 2011 shows 
no significant change in Tobin’s q and other valuation metrics. My results did show that 
companies on average spend $158 more on research and development for every 
additional million dollars in industry import exposure from China. This is a different 
result than what was found in Autor, Dorn, Hanson, Pisano, and Shu (2017). Their results 
showed a decrease in expenses. Possible explanations for this difference are different 
samples and different sampling period. Additionally, even though the correlation was 
positive, the change in expense percent on average was negative. This is because large 
companies increased their research significantly more than small companies, as 
percentages are weighted equally and total expense is more heavily influenced by 
company size. This finding is also consistent with the idea that increased competition 
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forces companies to have to innovate. The other variable of significance is changes in 
property plant and equipment. Here I found that on average for every additional million 
dollars in industry import exposure, the company’s property plant and equipment 
declined by $4,899. This would imply that companies are investing less as competition 
increases. This could be a factor in lower levels of profitability leading to lower levels of 
cash available for investment.  
 When regressing my data on trade exposure excluding data from the Great 
Recession, the results statistically significant declines in value with increased import 
exposure for changes in revenue, EBIT, EBITDA, capital expenditures, cash and short 
term investments, PPE and assets. On average a company experiences a decreases of 
$35,584 in revenue, $4,427 in EBIT, $5,067 in EBITDA, $1,505 in capital expenditure 
for each additional million increase import penetration from China. Company balance 
sheets also experience a decline. On average a company experiences a decline of $2,234 
in cash and short term investments, $8,186 in property plant and equipment, and $9,229 
in assets for an additional million in import penetration. The changes in sales, 
profitability, and expenditure numbers are particularly interesting because they are not 
felt in the valuation metrics. I would expect to see valuations go down if sales, 
profitability, and investment go down. Although changes in profitability, sales, and 
expenditures are not felt in valuation metrics they are seen on the balance sheet through 
lower levels of cash, PPE and Assets. This could be due to either lower levels of 
investment and profitability leading to lower asset levels through not generating enough 
profit to cover their previous balance sheet levels or a result of increased competition 
making it so an additional dollar of investment leads to less than an additional dollar of 
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output. These areas of statistical significance show a number of trends that should lead to 
lower levels of valuation, but even with declining revenue and margins companies are not 
experiencing a decrease in market cap, Tobin’s q, or enterprise value to EBITDA in 
relation to increased import exposure.  
 When running my regressions, I made sure to account for company size so that I 
could better understand the impact of trade on companies. I isolated these factors so I 
could compare the company sizes to each other and also account for extraneous variables 
that can occur due to company size. Small cap companies are positively statistically 
significant in changes in market cap, EBIT, and EBITDA while mid cap companies are 
not statistically significant in changes in market cap, but is positively significant in 
changes in EBIT, EBIT margin, EBITDA and EBITDA margin. Large cap companies 
experienced no statistical changes in regards to valuation metrics, sales, and profits. 
These results to not correspond with my hypothesis. I expected to find a decrease in 
valuations and investment, and even when accounting for company size my results did 
not show a negative correlation. One area that did support my hypothesis is negative 
statistical significance for research and development expenses. Large and mid-cap 
companies experienced a decline in changes in research and development expense, which 
is consistent with the findings in Autor, Dorn, Hanson, Pisano, and Shu (2017). Overall 
even when splitting up my data by company size, I do not find results consistent with my 
hypothesis in regards to valuation, but I did find results consistent with hypothesis in 
relations to lower levels of investment. See tables 1 through 4 for the entirety of my 
regression results.  
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 Although my results did not find any significant changes in valuation metrics, the 
absence of change also provides valuable insights. Increase trade exposure will produce 
both winners and losers, but on average Chinese imports appear to have no effect. Even 
though the United States has lost jobs as a result of Chinese imports (Autor, Dorn, 
Hanson, 2016), companies are benefits from cheaper inputs even though many have been 
forced to downsize. This might make it so companies in the short run might be hit due to 
a readjustment period, but in the long run there should be no long lasting effects on low 
technology manufacturing firms. These findings coincide with the basic fundamentals of 
capitalism, companies adjust to new obstacles and in the long run they maximize their 
profits.  
 My findings also show that market cap and assets are highly correlated.8 This 
would explain why changes in assets are statistically significant with trade but Simple q 
is not. Market cap and assets are moving together and canceling out the effects. I am 
experiencing a similar issue with my TEV to EBITDA multiple. Changes in EBITDA are 
positively correlated with changes in cash and short term investments, and market cap. 
Although debt is not correlated, two of major factors making up enterprise value are 
making it so the effects are canceling each other out and thus I am experiencing no 
statistical significance in my valuation metrics.  
4.4 Limitations and Caveats  
There are several concerns I have with my data in this regression. The first being 
that matching the import exposure to specific industry codes is not as precise as I would 
                                                          
8 See appendix for Correlation Matrix 
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like it to be. I had issues getting import data on specific SIC codes. The second issue is 
that Compustat did not include whether certain companies went bankrupt or which 
companies got bought out. Bankrupted companies would have had the largest impact on 
my data set. There were over 200 companies in my data set that did not have data for the 
whole time period. Eliminating them would bias my data toward successful firms so my 
ability to incorporate the proper data for bankrupted firms was limited. The largest 
limitation of the data is the exclusion of private firms. There is nothing that could have 
been done about this but this larger data set would have given me more accurate results.  
 Using financial metrics also created a set of issues. There are so many external 
factors that can drive financial valuations. The overall state of the stock market is most 
likely the biggest driver in valuations. Figures 2 and 6 both show valuation metrics 
declining in 2008 due to the state of the economy and market as a whole. This makes it 
difficult to isolate what factors are truly influencing the valuation metrics. This 
additionally created a problem because trade also declined, meaning that both the 
valuation and trade would be positively correlated that year due to reasons unrelated to 
import penetration. I controlled for this by removing the changes from 2008 to 2009 from 
my data but the effects may have lingered longer than just one year. These macro-
economic factors severely limited how my data can be interpreted, since macroeconomic 
changes cause a wide array of effects.  
 Some companies on my list benefitted from Chinese imports due to having lower 
input costs while other companies were harmed due to their outputs being unable to 
compete with Chinese prices. I was unable to determine variables that would predict 
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which manufacturing firms benefitted and which firms were harmed. Additional research 
could shed light on this issue.  
 Because of the issues with my data and valuation metrics my results can do little 
other than show correlation. Correlation can be valuable when evaluating potential 
impacts of international trade on United States company investment and public valuations 
but under no circumstances can my data be used to imply any sort of causation. The 
results may also reflect spurious associations because of omitted variables, such as, 
government tax laws, cost of debt, and GDP growth to name a few. Table 6 shows that 
GDP growth has a large impact on my data. Because of these extraneous variables my 
data can under no conditions imply causation but instead can lay ground work for further 
research.  
V Conclusion  
 Does increased import competition have an effect on valuation metrics? My 
research suggests that the answer is no. Although valuation metrics are unaffected, my 
analysis did find instances of reduced profits, reduced research and development, and 
reduced capital expenditure when accounting for the Great Recession. These results point 
to Chinese imports being associated with impacts on low tech United States 
manufacturing firms but these changes are not reflected in Simple q or TEV to EBITDA 
metrics.  
 The relationships between imports and investment and research reflect the 
opposite sign to what I expected. It is often anticipated that increased competition will 
make firms want to spend additional funds on investment and research so they can better 
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compete in the future but instead the opposite occurred. This could be a result that greater 
competition in manufacturing could lead to a decline in profitability, which my 
regression found in some cases, that then reduces the incentives to invest in research and 
development (Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980). This could also be that the additional 
expenditure on investment and research does not yield enough return to warrant 
additional spending.  
My results show that some firms experience decreases in profitability and 
expenditures associated with imports, but causation is not implied; for other firms there is 
no such correlation.  
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VI Appendix 
Table 6: Correlation Matrix for Data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Correlation Metrix for Data
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(1)  Δ Trade  1.00000
(2)  Δ GDP Growth  0.63800***  1.00000
(3)  Δ Tobins Q  0.01590  0.02050  1.00000
(4)  Δ Market Value  0.00616  0.05110**  0.00016  1.00000
(5)  Δ TEV to EBITDA  0.01120  0.00631  0.00320  0.00172  1.00000
(6)  Δ Capex to D&A.  0.02390  0.02770 -0.01880  0.00142 -0.00843  1.00000
(7)  Δ Revenue -0.00571  0.08880*** -0.00001  0.32700*** -0.00185  0.00572  1.00000
(8)  Δ EBIT  0.01060  0.08100*** -0.00000  0.47400*** -0.00094  0.00468  0.91700***  1.00000
(9)  Δ EBIT Margin  0.00951  0.01380 -0.00033  0.00068  0.00031 -0.01120 -0.00022 -0.00047  1.00000
(10) Δ EBITDA  0.00582  0.07770*** -0.00000  0.49500*** -0.00097  0.00412  0.91600***  0.99700*** -0.00048  1.00000
(11) Δ EBITDA Margin  0.00949  0.01340 -0.00033  0.00068  0.00019 -0.01170 -0.00024 -0.00050  1.00000*** -0.00050
(12) Δ R&D Expense  0.04100*  0.05150** -0.00013  0.19200*** -0.00109  0.00298  0.19200***  0.14000***  0.00233  0.15400***
(13) Δ R&D Expense Percent -0.01140 -0.01340 -0.00085 -0.00002  0.00014  0.02440  0.00011 -0.00002 -0.66600*** -0.00001
(14) Δ Capital Expenditure -0.02500  0.03260 -0.00005  0.14100*** -0.00318  0.02210  0.40200***  0.32400*** -0.00024  0.35600***
(15) Δ Capex to EBITDA  0.01200  0.00900  0.00090 -0.00015  0.77500*** -0.00959 -0.00167 -0.00046 -0.00009 -0.00073
(16) Δ Debt -0.03380 -0.04360* -0.00021  0.00552  0.00270 -0.00306  0.00377 -0.03000 -0.00010 -0.00520
(17) Δ Cash -0.01610  0.03970* -0.00000  0.33500***  0.00107 -0.00115  0.52700***  0.60500*** -0.00018  0.59700***
(18) Δ PPE -0.04810** -0.00359 -0.00003  0.24100*** -0.00080  0.00313  0.31500***  0.23600*** -0.00027  0.28800***
(19) Δ Asset -0.01700  0.03120 -0.00014  0.58500*** -0.00104  0.00444  0.50700***  0.48500*** -0.00036  0.52800***
(20) Recession -0.59100*** -0.85300***  0.00042 -0.00544 -0.01180 -0.01610 -0.11300*** -0.09180*** -0.00112 -0.08860***
Variables (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20)
(1)  Δ Trade
(2)  Δ GDP Growth
(3)  Δ Tobins Q
(4)  Δ Market Value
(5)  Δ TEV to EBITDA
(6)  Δ Capex to D&A.
(7)  Δ Revenue
(8)  Δ EBIT
(9)  Δ EBIT Margin
(10) Δ EBITDA
(11) Δ EBITDA Margin  1.00000
(12) Δ R&D Expense  0.00235  1.00000
(13) Δ R&D Expense Percent -0.67300***  0.00082  1.00000
(14) Δ Capital Expenditure -0.00024  0.22400***  0.00018  1.00000
(15) Δ Capex to EBITDA -0.00012  0.00841  0.00002 -0.00571  1.00000
(16) Δ Debt -0.00008  0.16600*** -0.00003 -0.01500  0.00562  1.00000
(17) Δ Cash -0.00019  0.02900  0.00013 -0.08810***  0.00114 -0.01800  1.00000
(18) Δ PPE -0.00026  0.11600***  0.00015  0.67400*** -0.00171  0.23400*** -0.10600***  1.00000
(19) Δ Asset -0.00036  0.36100***  0.00020  0.57200*** -0.00087  0.35700***  0.20900***  0.76400***  1.00000
(20) Recession -0.00069 -0.056000**  0.00946 -0.04430* -0.00855  0.02590 -0.03450* -0.00117 -0.02570  1.00000
* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001
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Figure 7: Foreign Direct Investment into China (Wuttke, 2017)
 
Figure 8: Patenting and trade exposure (Autor, Dorn, Hanson, Pisano, Shu, 2017 
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SIC Codes for Computstat Data:  
2111 2321 2322 2323 2325 2326 2329 2331 2335 2337 2339 2341 2342 2353 2361 2369 
2371 2381 2384 3385 2386 2387 2389 2911 2951 2952 2992 2999 3011 3021 3052 3053 
3061 3069 3081 3082 3083 3084 3085 3086 3087 3088 3089 3143 3144 3149 3151 3312 
3313 3315 3316 3317 3321 3322 3324 3325 3331 3334 3339 3341 3351 3353 3354 3355 
3356 3357 3363 3364 3365 3366 3369 3398 3399 3411 3412 3421 3423 3425 3429 3431 
3432 3433 3441 3442 3443 3444 3446 3448 3449 3451 3452 3462 3463 3465 3466 3469 
3471 3479 3482 3483 3484 3489 3491 3492 3493 3494 3495 3496 3497 3498 3499 3511 
3519 3523 3524 3531 3532 3533 3534 3535 3536 3537 3541 3542 3543 3544 3545 3546 
3547 3548 3549 3522 3553 3554 3555 3556 3559 3561 3562 3563 3564 3565 3566 3567 
3568 3569 3571 3572 3575 3577 3578 3579 3581 3582 3585 3586 3589 3592 3593 3594 
3596 3599 3612 3613 3612 3624 3625 3629 3631 3633 3634 3635 3639 3641 3643 3644 
3645 3646 3647 3648 3651 3652 3661 3663 3669 3671 6374 3675 3676 3677 3678 3679 
3691 3692 3694 3695 3699 
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